We study the logical complexity of proofs in cyclic arithmetic (CA), as introduced by Simpson in [Sim17] , in terms of quantifier alternations of formulae occurring. Writing CΣ n for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σ n formulae, our main result is that IΣ n+1 and CΣ n prove the same Π n+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0. Furthermore, due to the 'uniformity' of our method, we also show that CA and Peano Arithmetic (PA) proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size.
Introduction
Cyclic and non-wellfounded proofs have been studied by a number of authors as an alternative to proofs by induction. This includes cyclic systems for fragments of the modal µ-calculus, e.g. [NW96, SD03, DHL06, DBHS16, Dou17, AL17], structural proof theory for logics with fixed-points, e.g. [San02, FS13, For14, BDS16] , (automated) proofs of program termination in separation logic, e.g. [BBC08, BDP11, RB17] and, in particular, cyclic systems for first-order logic with inductive definitions, e.g. [Bro05, Bro06, BS07, BS11] . Due to the somewhat implicit nature of invariants they define, cyclic systems can be advantageous for metalogical analysis, for instance offering better algorithms for proof search, e.g. [BGP12, DP17] .
Cyclic proofs may be seen as more intuitively analogous to proofs by 'infinite descent' than proofs by induction (see, e.g., [Sim17] ); this subtle difference is enough to make inductive invariants rather hard to generate from cyclic proofs. Indeed it was recently shown that simulating cyclic proofs using induction is not possible for some sub-arithmetic languages [BT17a] , but becomes possible once arithmetic reasoning is available [Sim17, BT17b] .
Cyclic arithmetic was proposed as a general subject of study by Simpson in [Sim17] . Working in the language of arithmetic, it replaces induction by non-wellfounded proofs with a certain 'fairness' condition on the infinite branches. The advantage of this approach to infinite proof theory as opposed to, say, infinite well-founded proofs via an ω-rule (see, e.g., [Sch77] ), is that it admits a notion of finite proofs: those that have only finitely many distinct subproofs, and so may be represented by a finite (possibly cyclic) graph.
Cyclic arithmetic itself is to cyclic proofs what Peano arithmetic is to traditional proofs: it provides a general framework in which many arguments can be interpreted and/or proved in a uniform manner, and this is one reason why it is an interesting subject of study. This is already clear from, say, the results of [BT17b] , where the study of cyclic proofs for firstorder logic with inductive definitions relied on an underlying arithmetic framework. We elaborate further on this in Sect. 10.
Contribution. In [Sim17] , Simpson shows that Peano Arithmetic (PA) (i.e. with induction) is able to simulate cyclic reasoning by proving the soundness of the latter in the former. (The converse result is obtained much more easily.) Nonetheless, several open questions remain from [Sim17] , concerning constructivity, normalisation, logical complexity and proof complexity for cyclic and non-wellfounded proofs.
In this work we address the logical complexity and proof complexity of proofs in Cyclic Arithmetic (CA), as compared to PA. Namely, we study how quantifier alternation of proofs in one system compares to that in the other, and furthermore how the size of proofs compare. Writing CΣ n for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σ n formulae, we show, for n ≥ 0:
(1) IΣ n+1 ⊆ CΣ n over Π n+1 theorems (Sect. 4, Thm. 15).
(2) CA and PA proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size (Sect. 6, Thm. 32).
(3) CΣ n ⊆ IΣ n+1 over all theorems (Sect. 7, Thm. 35).
(1) is obtained by proof theoretic techniques, relying on normal forms and structural manipulations of Peano Arithmetic proofs. It improves upon the natural result that IΣ n ⊆ CΣ n , although induces a non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs. (2) is obtained via a certain 'uniformisation' of the approach of [Sim17] . In particular, by specialising the key intermediate results to the case of cyclic proofs, we are able to extract small PA proofs of some required properties of infinite word automata from analogous ones in 'second-order' (SO) arithmetic. Finally, (3) is obtained by calibrating the argument of (2) with recent results on the reverse mathematics of Büchi's theorem [KMPM16] , allowing us to bound the logical complexity of proofs in the simulation. Together, these results almost completely characterise the logical and proof complexity theoretic strength of cyclic proofs in arithmetic, answering the questions (ii) and (iii), Sect. 7 of [Sim17] .
After demonstrating these results, we give a metamathematical analysis of provability in cyclic theories, in particular showing that the consistency of CΣ n is provable in IΣ n+2 but not IΣ n+1 , by appealing to a form of Gödel incompleteness for cyclic theories. We also use these observations to show that certain formulations of McNaughton's theorem, that every nondeterministic Büchi automaton has an equivalent deterministic parity (or Rabin, Muller, etc.) automaton, are not provable in the SO theory RCA 0 . The general question of the logical strength of McNaughton's theorem was left open in the aforementioned recent work [KMPM16] .
Structure of the paper. In Sects. 2 and 3 we introduce some preliminaries on Peano Arithmetic, proof theory, cyclic proofs and automaton theory. In Sect. 4 we present (1) and give an example of the translation in App. A. The contents of Sects. 2 -4 and App. A are more-or-less self contained and should be accessible to the general proof theorist.
We briefly introduce some SO theories of arithmetic in Sect. 5 that are conservative over the fragments of PA we need in order to conduct some of the intermediate arguments on infinite word automata. In Sect. 6 we present (2), and in Sect. 7 we adapt the argument to obtain (3). In Sect. 8 we give our metamathematical analysis of cyclic theories, and in Sect. 9 we explain their consequences for the logical strength of certain forms of McNaughton's theorem. We conclude with some further remarks and perspectives in Sect. 10, including a comparison with the results of [Sim17] and [BT17b] . For these sections it would be helpful for the reader to have some background in subsystems of second-order arithmetic (see e.g. [Sim09, Hir14] ), ω-automaton theory (see e.g. [Tho97] ) and metamathematics of first-order arithmetic (see e.g. [HP93] ), though we aim to give sufficient details for the general proof theorist to appreciate the content.
Preliminaries on first-order arithmetic proof theory
We present only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to consult, e.g., [Bus98] for a more thorough introduction to first-order arithmetic (we will follow that exposition here).
We work in first-order (FO) logic with equality, =, with variables written x, y, z etc., terms written s, t, u etc., and formulae written ϕ, ψ etc., construed over the logical basis {¬, ∨, ∧, ∃, ∀}. We will usually assume formulae are in De Morgan normal form, with negation restricted to atomic formulae. Nonetheless, we may write ¬ϕ for the De Morgan We also write ϕ ⊃ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ≡ ψ for (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ).
FO logic has equality 'built-in', i.e. we always assume the following axioms are present:
, for each k ∈ N and each predicate symbol P of arity k. Following [Sim17] , the language of arithmetic (with inequality) is formulated as {0, s, +, ×, <}, with their usual interpretations over N. A theory is a set T of closed formulae over this language. We write T ⊢ ϕ if ϕ is a logical consequence of T . We write
The theory of Robinson arithmetic (with inequality), written Q, is axiomatised by:
Notice that, above and elsewhere, we may write · instead of × in terms, or even omit the symbol altogether, and we assume it binds more strongly than +. We also write ∀x < t.ϕ and ∃x < t.ϕ as abbreviations for ∀x.(x < t ⊃ ϕ) and ∃x.(x < t ∧ ϕ) resp. Formulae with only such quantifiers are called bounded.
As usual, we may assume that Q is axiomatised by the universal closures of bounded formulae. In particular the existential quantifiers in axioms (Q3) and (Q8) above may be bounded by x and y resp., provably under quantifier-free induction. We will implicitly assume this bounded axiomatisation for the sequent calculus formulation of arithmetic later.
Remark 1. Our basic axioms and, later, our inference rules differ slightly from those in [Sim17] , however it is routine to see that the theories PA and CA defined in this work coincide with those of [Sim17] . In particular the axiomatisations are equivalent once even open induction is present (this is weaker than any theory we will consider). We chose a slightly different presentation so that we could readily apply certain metalogical results, such as Thm. 5, with no intermediate proof manipulation.
Definition 2 (Arithmetical hierarchy). For n ≥ 0, we define:
Notice in particular that, due to De Morgan normal form, if ϕ ∈ Σ n then ¬ϕ ∈ Π n and vice-versa. In practice we often consider these classes of formulae up to logical equivalence. We say that a formula is in ∆ n (in a theory T ) if it is equivalent to both a Σ n and Π n formula (resp. provably in T ).
Definition 3 (Arithmetic). Peano Arithmetic (PA) is axiomatised by Q and the axiom schema of induction:
For a class of formulae Φ, we write Φ-IND for the set of induction axiom instances when ϕ ∈ Φ in (2.1). Furthermore, we write IΦ for the theory Q + Φ-IND.
The following is a classical result:
Proposition 4 (See e.g. [Bus98, Kay91] ). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣ n = IΠ n .
2.1.
A sequent calculus presentation of PA. We will work with a standard sequent calculus presentation of FO logic, given in Fig. 1 , where i ∈ {0, 1} and a, known as the 'eigenvariable', is fresh, i.e. does not occur free in the lower sequent. Two important considerations are that we work with cedents as sets, i.e. there is no explicit need for contraction rules, and that we have an explicit substitution rule. In the θ-sub rule the 'substitution' θ is a mapping from variables to terms, which is extended in the natural way to cedents. Substitution is important for the definition of a cyclic arithmetic proof in the next section, but does not change provability in usual proofs. The sequent calculus for Q is obtained from the FO calculus in the language of arithmetic by adding appropriate initial sequents for each instantiation of an axiom of Q by terms. For theories extending Q by (at least quantifier-free) induction, we assume that these intial sequents contain only ∆ 0 formulae by appropriately bounding the existential quantifiers. The schema Φ-IND, for Φ closed under subformulas and substitution, is implemented in the calculus by adding the induction rule,
Here we require a to not occur free in the lower sequent. Notice that this satisfies the subformula property, in the 'wide' sense of FO logic, i.e. up to substitution. For fragments of PA with induction axioms of bounded logical complexity, we also have the bounded quantifier rules:
In all cases the eigenvariable a occurs only as indicated, The following normalisation result is well-known in the proof theory of arithmetic, and will be one of our main proof-theoretic tools throughout this work:
Theorem 5 (Free-cut elimination, e.g. [Bus98] ). Let S be a sequent system extending FO by the induction rule and some other nonlogical rules/axioms closed under substitution. Then any S-proof can be effectively transformed into one of the same conclusion containing only (substitution instances of ) subformulae of the conclusion, an induction formula or a formula occurring in another nonlogical step.
Naturally, this applies to the various fragments of PA that we consider. In particular, notice that a proof in IΣ n or IΠ n of Σ n or Π n formulae, resp., contains just Σ n or Π n formulae, resp. It is well known that Thm. 5 can itself be proved within IΣ 1 and even weaker theories (see, e.g., [HP93] ), under an appropriate coding of mathematical objects. We use this observation later in Sect. 8.
We say that a sequent is Σ n (or Π n ) if it contains only Σ n (resp. Π n ) formulae. A slight issue that will be relevant later in Sect. 4 is that we have not defined Σ n and Π n as being syntactically closed under positive Boolean combinations, even if semantically we know that they are. In fact, this does not cause a problem for the result above, since we can always prenex 'on the fly' in a proof by cutting against appropriate derivations. For instance, in a proof, a step of the form, Γ ⇒ ∆, ∀x.ϕ Γ ⇒ ∆, ∀y.ψ ∧ Γ ⇒ ∆, ∀x.ϕ ∧ ∀y.ψ may be locally replaced by a derivation of the form:
In a similar way we will often assume that a 'block' of existential or universal quantifiers is coded by a single quantifier, using pairings and Gödel β functions, whose basic properties are all formalisable already in I∆ 0 (see, e.g., [Bus98] ).
Preliminaries on cyclic arithmetic and automata
Before presenting 'cyclic arithmetic', we will present the general notion of non-wellfounded proofs in arithmetic, from [Sim17] . Definition 6. A preproof is a possibly infinite binary tree labeled by sequents in a locally correct manner in the calculus for Q. Following [Sim17] , we treat inference steps as nodes of the tree and sequents as edges. A preproof is regular if it has only finitely many distinct subtrees or, equivalently, if it is the unfolding of a finite directed graph, possibly with cycles.
The following notions are variants of those from Dfns. 1 and 2 in [Sim17]:
Definition 7 (Precursors, traces, ∞-proofs). Let (Γ i ⇒ ∆ i ) i≥0 be an infinite branch through a preproof. For terms t, t ′ we say that t ′ is a precursor of t at i if one of the following holds: i) Γ i ⇒ ∆ i concludes a θ-sub-step and t is θ(t ′ ). ii) Γ i ⇒ ∆ i concludes any other step and t ′ = t occurs in Γ i . iii) Γ i ⇒ ∆ i concludes any other step and t ′ is t. A trace along (Γ i ⇒ ∆ i ) i≥0 is a sequence (t i ) i≥n , for some n ≥ 0, such that whenever i ≥ n the term t i occurs in Γ i ⇒ ∆ i and, (a) t i+1 is a precursor of t i at i; or (b) the atomic formula t i+1 < t occurs in Γ i+1 , where t is a precursor of t i at i. When (b) holds, we say that the trace progresses at i + 1.
An ∞-proof is a preproof such that any infinite branch has a trace that progresses infinitely often. If it is regular then we simply call it a cyclic proof. CA is the theory induced by cyclic proofs in the calculus for Q.
Remark 8. When defining explicit traces, for the precursor case iii), we will typically not worry about whether the term t i in a trace occurs in the sequent or not. All that matters is that, if the current step is ∃-l, ∀-r or sub, t i does not contain the associated eigenvariables. 1 As long as we satisfy this constraint we may simply consider an equivalent proof that prepends t i = t i to the antecedent to make sure that t i 'occurs'. We use this assumption implicitly in the remainder of this work.
The reader may consult [Sim17] for several examples of ∞-proofs. Notably, ∞-proofs are sound and complete for the standard model N (Thm. 4, [Sim17] ). (Similar results for other logics, with respect to standard models, were known before [Bro06, BS11] .) We recall the proof since we will have to formalise a variant of it in Sect. 6, and also since the quantifier case in the argument of [Sim17] is omitted, whereas this subtlety will need some consideration when it is formalised.
Proposition 9 (Soundness of ∞-proofs). If π is an ∞-proof of ϕ, then N ϕ.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e. N ¬ϕ. We will inductively construct an infinite branch (Γ i ⇒ ∆ i ) i≥0 of π and associated assignments ρ i of natural numbers to each sequent's free variables, such that N, ρ i Γ i ⇒ ∆ i . Assuming ϕ is closed (by taking its universal closure), we set Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 to be ⇒ ϕ and ρ 0 = ∅.
Each step except for substitution, ∀-r and ∃-l constitutes a true implication, so if N, ρ i Γ i ⇒ ∆ i then ρ i also must not satisfy one of its premisses. We may thus choose one such premiss as Γ i+1 ⇒ ∆ i+1 and set ρ i+1 = ρ i . If Γ i ⇒ ∆ i concludes a θ-sub step, we may set ρ i+1 = ρ i • θ. If Γ i ⇒ ∆ i concludes a ∀-r step, let ∀x.ϕ be the principal formula and assume x does not occur free in the conclusion. Since N, ρ i Γ i ⇒ ∆ i , we must have that N, ρ i ∃x.¬ϕ. We choose a value k ∈ N witnessing this existential and set ρ i+1 = ρ i ∪ {x → k}. The ∃-l case is dealt with similarly.
This infinite branch must have an infinitely progressing trace, say (t i ) i≥n , by the definition of ∞-proof. However notice that, for i ≥ n, ρ i (t i ) ≥ ρ i+1 (t i+1 ) and, furthermore, at a progress point along the trace, ρ i (t i ) > ρ i+1 (t i+1 ). Thus, (ρ i (t i )) i≥n is a monotone decreasing sequence of natural numbers that does not converge, contradicting the fact that N is well-ordered.
Later, in Sect. 6, we will use the fact that the choices for generating an invalid branch in the proof above can be made uniformly in an arithmetic setting.
3.1. Defining CΣ n . Simpson proposes in [Sim17] to study systems of cyclic proofs containing only Σ n formulae, and to compare such systems to IΣ n . This is rather pertinent in light of the free-cut elimination result we stated, Thm. 5: any IΣ n -proof of a Σ n -sequent can be assumed to contain just Σ n formulae (possibly at a non-elementary cost in proof size), whence the comparison. However, in order to be able to admit routine derivations of more complex formulae, e.g. the Σ n+1 law of excluded middle or the universal closure of a Σ n sequent, we will close this notion under logical consequence.
Definition 10. Let Φ be a set of formulae closed under subformulae and substitution. CΦ is the first-order theory axiomatised by the universal closures of conclusions of cyclic proofs containing only Φ-formulae.
Notice that, by the free-cut elimination result, Thm. 5, and the subformula property, any CΣ n proofs of Σ n -sequents contain only Σ n -sequents anyway, without loss of generality. This more 'robust' definition allows us to easily compare fragments of cyclic arithmetic. For instance, we have the following:
Proposition 11. CΣ n = CΠ n , for n ≥ 0.
Proof. For the left-right inclusion, replace each Σ n sequent p, Γ ⇒ ∆ with the sequent p, ∆ ⇒ Γ, where Γ and ∆ contain the De Morgan dual formulae of Γ and ∆ resp. and p exhausts the atomic formulae of the antecedent. Any traces will be preserved and the proof can be made correct by locally adding some logical steps. The converse implication is proved in the same way.
Using a standard technique, e.g. from [Bro06] , we also can rather simply show the following result: 2 Proposition 12. IΣ n ⊆ CΣ n , for n ≥ 0.
Proof sketch. Given an IΣ n proof, we simply simulate every local inference step, the only nontrivial case being an induction step:
This is simulated by the following cyclic derivation,
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. An infinite branch that does not have a tail in the proofs of the two premisses of ind must hit • infinitely often. Therefore it admits an infinitely progressing trace alternating between a and b, with the progress point underlined above.
Following Rmk. 8, notice that, e.g. in the simulation of induction above, traces need not be connected in the graph of ancestry of a proof. This deviates from other settings where it is occurrences that are tracked, rather than terms [DBHS16, BDS16, Dou17].
3.2. Büchi automata: checking correctness of cyclic proofs. A cyclic preproof can be effectively checked for correctness by reduction to the inclusion of 'Büchi automata', yielding a PSPACE bound. As far as the author is aware, this is the best known upper bound, although no corresponding lower bound is known. As we will see later in Sect. 6, this is one of the reasons why we cannot hope for a 'polynomial simulation' of cyclic proofs in a usual proof system, and so why elementary simulations are more pertinent.
From a cyclic preproof π we can easily define two automata, say A π b and A π t , 3 respectively accepting just the branches and just the branches with infinitely progressing traces. See [Sim17] for a construction of A π t . We point out that A π b is essentially just the dependency graph of π with all states final, and so is in fact deterministic; 4 we will rely on this observation later in Sects. 6, 7 and 9. We now state the well-known 'correctness criterion' for cyclic proofs:
4.
A translation from IΣ n+1 to CΣ n , over Π n+1 -theorems
We show in this section our first result, that cyclic proofs containing only Σ n -formulae are enough to simulate IΣ n+1 over not-too-complex formulae:
Theorem 15. IΣ n+1 ⊆ CΣ n , over Π n+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0.
One example of such logical power in cyclic proofs was given in [Sim17] , in the form of CΣ 1 proofs of the totality of the Ackermann-Péter function. This already separates it from IΣ 1 , which only proves the totality of the primitive recursive functions [Par72] . To prove the theorem above, we will rather work in IΠ n+1 , cf. Prop. 4, since the exposition is more intuitive. We first prove the following intermediate lemma.
Lemma 16. Let π be a IΠ n+1 proof, containing only Π n+1 formulae, of a sequent,
where Γ, ∆, ϕ i , ψ j are Σ n and x i , y j occur only in ϕ i , ψ j respectively. Then there is a CΣ n derivation ⌈π⌉ of the form:
. . , ψ m Moreover, no free variables of (4.1) occur as eigenvariables for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps in ⌈π⌉.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of π. Notice that we may assume that any Π n+1 formulae occurring have just a single outermost ∀ quantifier, by interpreting arguments as pairs and using Gödel's β functions. (This introduces only cuts on formulae of the same form.) We henceforth write ϕ for ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ l and ψ for ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m and, as an abuse of notation, ∀ x. ϕ and ∀ y. ψ for ∀x 1 .ϕ 1 , . . . , ∀x l .ϕ l and ∀y 1 .ψ 1 , . . . , ∀y m .ψ m respectively. (Notice that this is a reasonable abuse of notation, since ∀s can be prenexed outside conjunctions and disjunctions already in pure FO logic.)
Propositional logical steps are easily dealt with, relying on invertibility and cuts, with possible structural steps. Importantly, due to the statement of the lemma, such steps apply to only Σ n formulae (recall the discussion at the end of Sect. 2). For instance, if π extends a proof π ′ by a ∧-left step,
and if π extends proofs π 0 and π 1 by a ∧-right step,
then we define ⌈π⌉ as:
If π extends a proof π ′ by a thinning step,
where Γ ′ , ∆ ′ , χ are Σ n and Π is Π n+1 , then we define ⌈π⌉ as:
where Γ ′ , ⌈π ′ ⌉, ∆ ′ is obtained from ⌈π ′ ⌉ by prepending Γ ′ and appending ∆ ′ to each sequent. For this we might need to rename some free variables in π ′ so that eigenvariable conditions are preserved after the transformation; this does not affect the cedents Γ, ∆ by the assumption from the inductive hypothesis. Notice that we are simply ignoring the extra premisses due to Π.
If π extends proofs π 0 and π 1 by a cut step on a Π n+1 formula,
The final dotted 'contraction' step is implicit, since we treat cedents as sets. Again, we might need to rename some variables in π 1 . If instead the cut formula were Σ n , say χ, we would define ⌈π⌉ as:
If π extends a proof π ′ by a ∀-left step,
where ∀z.χ(z) is Π n+1 , we define ⌈π⌉ as follows:
(Notice that, although z occurs as an eigenvariable for a sub step here, it is already bound in the conclusion of π, so we preserve the inductive hypothesis.) If π extends a proof π ′ by a ∀-right step,
If π extends a proof π ′ by a ∃-right step,
where ∃z.χ(z) is Σ n , then we define ⌈π⌉ as:
Again, some eigenvariables of π ′ might have to be renamed. Any other quantifier steps are dealt with routinely.
Finally, if π extends proofs π 0 and π ′ by an induction step,
we define ⌈π⌉ to be the following cyclic proof,
. . .
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. Notice that any branch hitting • infinitely often will have an infinitely progressing trace alternating between c and d, by the underlined progress point c < d: thanks to the assumption from the inductive hypothesis, c will not occur in ⌈π ′ ⌉ as an eigenvariable for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps so the trace along c in ⌈π ′ ⌉ remains intact, cf. Rmk. 8. Any other infinite branch has a tail that is already in ⌈π ′ ⌉ or ⌈π 0 ⌉ and so has an infinitely progressing trace by the inductive hypothesis.
The lemma above gives us a simple proof of the main result of this section:
Proof of Thm. 15. Let π is a IΠ n+1 proof of a sequent ⇒ ∀x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Σ n , under Prop. 4. By Thm. 5 we may assume that π contains only Π n+1 cuts, whence we may simply apply Lemma 16 to obtain a CΣ n proof of ⇒ ϕ. (Notice that there are no assumption sequents after applying the lemma since the antecedent is empty.) Now the result follows simply by an application of ∀-r.
For the interested reader, we have given an example of this translation in action in App. A, for a 'relativised' version of arithmetic with an uninterpreted function symbol.
Second-order theories for reasoning about automata
We now consider a two-sorted, or 'second-order' (SO), version of FO logic, with variables X, Y, Z, etc. ranging over sets of individuals, and new atomic formulae t ∈ X, sometimes written X(t). We also have SO quantifiers binding the SO variables with the natural interpretation. Again, we give only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to consult the standard texts [Sim09] and [Hir14] .
We write Q 2 for an appropriate extension of Q by basic axioms governing sets (see, e.g., [Sim09] or [Hir14] ), and write Σ 0 n and Π 0 n for the classes Σ n and Π n respectively, but now allowing free set variables to occur.
Definition 17. The recursive comprehension axiom schema is the following: 5
Notice that there is an unfortunate coincidence of the notation CA for 'comprehension axiom' and 'cyclic arithmetic', but the context of use should always avoid any ambiguity.
where ϕ, ψ are in Σ 0 1 and X does not occur free in ϕ or ψ. From here, the theory RCA 0 is defined as Q 2 + ∆ 0 1 -CA + Σ 0 1 -IND. Since we will always work in extensions of RCA 0 , which proves the totality of primitive recursive functions, we will conservatively add function symbols for primitive recursive functions on individuals whenever we need them. We will also henceforth consider FO theories extended by 'oracles', i.e. uninterpreted set/predicate variables, in order to access 'uniform' classes of FO proofs. We write IΣ n (X) for the same class of proofs as IΣ n but where X is allowed to occur as a predicate symbol. The usefulness of a IΣ n (X) proof is that we may later substitute X for a FO formula, say ϕ(−) ∈ ∆ m+1 , to arrive at a IΣ m+n proof of size O(|ϕ|). This 'parametrisation' of a FO proof allows us to avoid unnecessary blowups in proof size induced by 'non-uniform' translations from second-order theories; we implicitly use this observation for proof complexity bounds later, particularly in Sect. 6.
The following result is an adaptation of well known conservativity results, e.g. as found in [Sim09, Hir14] , but we include a proof anyway for completeness.
Proof sketch. First we introduce countably many fresh set symbols
These will serve as witnesses to the sets defined by comprehension. We replace the comprehension axioms by initial sequents of the form:
It is routine to show that these new initial sequents are equivalent to the comprehension axioms for ϕ, ψ. Now we apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 5, to a proof in such a system and replace every positive occurrence of t ∈ X t, Y ϕ,ψ with ϕ(t, t, Y ), and every negative occurrence, i.e. an occurrence of t / ∈ X t, Y ϕ,ψ with ψ(t, t, Y ). (Recall here that we assume formulae are in De Morgan normal form.) Any comprehension initial sequents affected by this replacement become identities in the case of (5.1), and purely logical theorems in the case of (5.2). Furthermore, any induction formulae remain Σ 0 1 , provably in pure logic, thanks to our consideration of positive and negative contexts. Any extraneous free set variables in induction steps (except X), e.g. Y , may be safely dealt with by replacing any atomic formula Y (s) with ⊤. The resulting proof is in IΣ n (X).
It is worth pointing out that, in general, the transformation from a SO proof to a FO proof can yield a possibly non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs, due to, e.g., the application of (free-)cut elimination. 5.1. Formalisation of Büchi acceptance. From now on we will be rather informal when talking about finite objects, e.g. automata, finite sequences, or even formulae. In particular we may freely use such objects within object-level formulae when, in fact, we are formally referring to their 'Gödel numbers'. Also, statements inside quotations, "-", will usually be (provably) recursive in any free variables occurring, i.e. ∆ 0 1 . This way quantifier complexity is safely measured by just the quantifiers outside quotations.
We may treat a set symbol X as a binary predicate by interpreting its argument as a pair and using Gödel's 'β functions' to primitive-recursively extract its components. We use such predicates to encode sequences by interpreting X(x, y) as "the x th symbol of X is y". Axiomatically, this means we presume we have already the totality and determinism of X as a binary relation. Formally, for a set S and a set symbol X treated as a binary predicate, we will write X ∈ S ω for the conjunction of the following two formulae,
e. X is, in fact, the graph of a function N → S. When we know that these formulae hold true for X, we may construe the expression X(x) as a term in formulae, for instance writing ϕ(X(x)) as shorthand for ∃y.(X(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently, ∀y.(X(x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)).
Definition 19 (Language membership). Let A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , F ) be a NBA and treat X a binary predicate symbol. We define the formula X ∈ L(A) as:
If A is deterministic and X ∈ A ω , we write q X (x, y) for "y is the x th state of the run of X on A", which is provably ∆ 0 1 in RCA 0 . Similarly to the case when X is the graph of a function (cf. 5.4,5.3), we may write ϕ(q X (x)) as shorthand for ∃y.(q X (x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently in RCA 0 , for ∀y.(q X (x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)). For DBA, we alternatively define X ∈ L(A) as:
This 'double definition' will not be problematic for us, since RCA 0 can check if an automaton is deterministic or not and, if so, even prove the equivalence between the two definitions:
Proposition 20. RCA 0 ⊢ ∀ DBA A.((5.5) ≡ (5.6)).
Proof sketch. Let A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , F ) be a deterministic automaton. For the left-right direction let Y ∈ Q ω be an 'accepting run' of X on A and use induction to show that Y (x, q X (x)). For the right-left direction, we use comprehension to define an 'accepting run'
. Clearly the definition of Y is ∆ 0 1 , and we can show that such Y is a 'correct run' by induction on x.
Notice that, for a deterministic automaton, the formula for acceptance is arithmetical in X, i.e. there are no SO quantifiers. This will be rather important for uniformity in the simulation of cyclic proofs in the next section.
Formalisations of some automaton constructions.
Recall that we may freely add symbols for primitive recursive functions to our language. Since we rely on various results from [KMPM16] as the 'engine' behind some of our proofs, we will use their notions for manipulating automata.
For NBA A, A ′ , we write A c and A ⊔ A ′ to denote the complement and union constructions of automata from [KMPM16] (cf. Sects. A and C resp.). We also write Empty(A) for the recursive algorithm from [KMPM16] (cf. Sect. C.1), expressed as a Σ 1 formula in A, determining whether A computes the empty language. It will also be useful for us later, in order to bound logical and proof complexity, to notice that DBA can already be complemented in RCA 0 . This is a rather unsurprising result but does not appear in [KMPM16] , so we give it here.
For a DBA A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , F ), we define a complementary NBA A c as follows,
The idea behind this construction is that a run of A c follows A freely for some finite time (in the '0' component), after which it may no longer visit final states of A (once in the '1' component). The determinism of A guarantees that such a word is not accepted by it.
By directly inspecting the definitions from [KMPM16] , and DBA complementation above, we have the following properties:
Observation 21. For NBA A, A ′ we have that:
(1) Empty(A) is a polynomial-time predicate in A.
(2) A ⊔ A ′ is constructible in polynomial-time from A and A ′ .
(3) A c is constructible in exponential-time from A. For a DBA A, we have that: (4) A c is constructible in polynomial-time from A.
None of these bounds are surprising, due to known bounds on the complexity of union, complementation and emptiness checking for (non)deterministic Büchi automata. Nonetheless it is important to state them for the particular constructions used in this work for bounds on proof complexity later.
Lemma 22. From [KMPM16] we have the following:
). We also have that:
Proof. 1, 2 and 3 follow from [KMPM16] , namely Lemma 14, Thm. 13 and Thms. 5 and 12, respectively, so we give a proof of 4. Working in RCA 0 , let A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , F ) be a DBA. For the right-left implication, if X / ∈ L(A) then ∃x.∀x ′ > x. q X (x) / ∈ F , so let x 0 witness this existential. Now, define by comprehension the run Y ∈ (Q c ) ω as follows:
Now, indeed Y (0, (q 0 , 0)), since q X (0) = q 0 , and Y is a correct run of X on A c by considering separately the cases x < x 0 , x = x 0 and x > x 0 . Finally, for any x, Y hits a final state at max(x, x 0 ) + 1 > x.
For the left-right implication, suppose X ∈ L(A c ) and let Y ∈ (Q c ) ω be an accepting run. By induction we have ∀x.(Y (x) = (q X (x), 0) ∨ Y (x) = (q X (x), 1)). Now, Y must eventually hit an accepting state of A c , i.e. in the 1-component, say at position x 0 . Again by induction, we may show that Y remains in the 1-component of A c after x 0 , and hence q X (x) / ∈ F for x ≥ x 0 , as required.
6. An exponential simulation of CA in PA In this section we will adapt Simpson's approach in [Sim17] for showing that CA ⊆ PA into a uniform result in PA. This essentially constitutes a formalisation of the soundness argument, Prop. 9, in a SO theory conservative over the target fragment of PA. The 'uniformity' we aim for ensures that the possibly non-elementary blowup translating from SO proofs to FO proofs occurs once and for all for a single arithmetical theorem. Only then do we instantiate the theorem (inside PA) by the cyclic proof in question, leading to an only elementary blowup.
To give an idea of how the result is obtained, and how our exposition refines that of [Sim17] , we take advantage of the following aspects of the soundness argument for cyclic proofs: (a) The Büchi automaton accepting all infinite branches of a cyclic proof is, in fact, deterministic, and so we can express acceptance of an ω-word in this automaton arithmetically. (b) A branch of invalid sequents and corresponding assignments, as in the proof of Prop. 9, can be uniformly generated from an initial unsatisfying assignment by an arithmetical formula. (c) Since all inductions are only up to ω, we need only arbitrarily often progressing traces, rather than explicit infinitely progressing traces. Together, these properties give us just enough 'wiggle room' to carry out the soundness argument in a sufficiently uniform way.
Throughout this section we will also carefully track how much quantifier complexity is used in theorem statements, since we will later modify this argument to obtain a converse result to Thm. 15. 6.1. An arithmetically uniform treatment of automata. Referring to (c) above, we define an arithmetical corollary of NBA acceptance that is nonetheless sufficiently strong to formalise the soundness argument for cyclic proofs:
Definition 23 (Arithmetic acceptance). Let A be a NBA and temporarily write: • F (x) := "x is a finite run of X on A ending at a final state". • E(z, x, y) := "z extends x to a finite run of X on A hitting ≥ y final states" We define:
ArAcc(X, A) := X ∈ A ω ∧ ∃x. (F (x) ∧ ∀y.∃z.E(z, x, y)) (6.1)
For intuition, we may consider ω-regular expressions rather than automata, which are of the form i<n e i · f ω i , for some n ∈ N, without loss of generality. The formula ArAcc for this expression essentially recognises infinite words that have prefixes of the form στ k for some σ ∈ L(e i ), for some i < n, and τ k ∈ L(f k i ) for each k ∈ N. Clearly the condition ArAcc is a consequence of acceptance itself:
Proposition 24. RCA 0 ⊢ ∀A.(X ∈ L(A) ⊃ ArAcc(X, A)).
Proof. Working in RCA 0 , fix A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , F ) and suppose X ∈ L(A). Let Y ∈ Q ω be an 'accepting run' of X on A, cf. (5.5). We may show that, ∃z ∈ Q * ."z is a finite prefix of Y hitting ≥ y final states in A" (6.2) by Σ 0 1 -induction on y, appealing to the unboundedness of final states in Y for both the base case and the inductive steps. Now, in the definition of ArAcc in (6.1), we set x to be the least such z for which (6.2)[1/y] holds (again by induction), so that F (x) from (6.1) holds. Thus, for any y ∈ N, we may find an appropriate z making E(z, x, y) in (6.1) true by appealing to (6.2). The fact that z extends x follows from leastness of x and that Y is a sequence, cf. (5.3) and (5.4).
Let us write
We may now present our main 'uniform' result needed to carry out our soundness proof in FO theories.
Proof. Working in RCA 0 +Σ 0 2 -IND, let A 1 be a DBA and A 2 be a NBA such that X ∈ L(A 1 ) and A 1 ⊑ A 2 . We have:
by Prop. 24.
Noticing that DBA acceptance is also purely arithmetical in X (cf. (a)), by the conservativity result Prop. 18, we have:
Corollary 26. IΣ 2 (X) proves (6.3).
6.2.
Formalising the soundness argument for cyclic proofs. At this point we are able to mostly mimic the formalisation of the soundness argument from [Sim17] , although we must further show that a branch of invalid sequents, cf. the proof of Prop. 9, is uniformly describable (cf. (b)). For n ≥ 0, let N, ρ n ϕ be an appropriate ∆ n+1 formula (provably in IΣ n+1 ) asserting that a formula ϕ is true in N under the assignment ρ of its free variables to natural numbers, as long as ϕ is a Boolean combination of Σ n (or Π n ) formulae. 6 Formally, the formula N, ρ n ϕ takes as arguments the codes of ρ and ϕ, i.e. their Gödel numbers; the construction of such a formula for n is standard (see, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93] ) and it has size polynomial in n. Importantly, there are IΣ n+1 proofs that n satisfies 'Tarski's truth conditions'. Writing Bool(Φ) for the class of Boolean combinations of Φ-formulae, we have:
Proposition 27 (Properties of n , see e.g. [HP93] ). For n ≥ 0, the following Π n+1 formulae have IΣ n+1 proofs of size polynomial in n:
(1) ∀ϕ ∈ Bool(Σ n ).∀ρ. (N, ρ n ¬ϕ ≡ N, ρ n ϕ).
(2) ∀ϕ, ψ ∈ Bool(Σ n ).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∨ N, ρ ψ)).
(3) ∀ϕ, ψ ∈ Bool(Σ n ).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∧ N, ρ ψ)). We also have IΣ n+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of the substitution property:
In particular we have the reflection property:
Proposition 28 (Reflection). For n ≥ 0 we have IΣ 1 ⊢ ϕ ≡ (N, ∅ n ϕ) with proofs of size polynomial in n and |ϕ|, for any closed formula ϕ ∈ Σ n ∪ Π n .
Henceforth, all our proof complexity bounds in n follow from the fact that proofs are parametrised by n and its basic properties from Prop. 27 above.
Definition 29 (Uniform description of an invalid branch). Let π be a CA preproof of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, and let n ∈ N be such that all formulae occurring in π are Σ n . Let ρ 0 be an assignment such that N, ρ 0 n Γ but N, ρ 0 n ∆. The branch of π generated by ρ 0 is the invalid branch as constructed in the proof of Prop. 9, where at each step that there is a choice of premiss the leftmost one is chosen, and at each step when there is a choice of assignment of a natural number to a free variable the least one is chosen. We write Branch n (π, ρ 0 , x, y) for the following predicate:
"the x th element of the branch generated by ρ 0 in π is y" To be precise, the 'element' y is given as a pair ρ x , Γ x ⇒ ∆ x consisting of a sequent Γ x ⇒ ∆ x and an assignment ρ x that invalidates it.
Notice that Branch n (π, ρ 0 , x, y) is recursive w.r.t. the oracle n , and so is expressible by a ∆ 1 ( n ) formula, making it altogether ∆ n+1 in its arguments. In fact, this is demonstrably the case in IΣ n+1 , which can prove that Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) is the graph of a function, as shown in Prop. 30 below.
Let us write conc(π) for the conclusion of a CA proof π and, as in Sect. 3.2, A π b and A π t for its branch and trace automata, resp. When we write N, ρ n (Γ ⇒ ∆) we mean the ∆ n+1 formula (N, ρ n Γ) ∨ (N, ρ n ∆).
Proposition 30. For n ≥ 0, there are IΣ n+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of: ∀π a CA preproof containing only Σ n formulae. ∀ρ 0 . ((N, ρ 0 n conc(π)) ⊃ Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) ∈ L(A π b )) (6.4)
Proof. Working in IΣ n+1 , let π and ρ 0 satisfy the hypotheses of (6.4) above. The fact that Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) is deterministic, cf. (5.4), follows directly by induction on the position of the branch. The difficult part is to show that Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) is total, cf. (5.3), i.e. that it never reaches a deadlock. For this we show,
by Σ n+1 -induction on x. The base case, when x = 0, follows by assumption, so we proceed with the inductive case. For a given x let ρ x , Γ x ⇒ ∆ x witness (6.5) above and let r be the rule instance in π that Γ x ⇒ ∆ x concludes. If r is a ∃-r step with associated term t, then there is only one premiss which we show remains false in the current assignment. This follows from: If r is a ∀-r step then there is only one premiss, for which we show that the appropriate invalidating assignment exists. This follows from,
where, in the penultimate implication, we rely on the fact that the appropriate 'minimisation' property is provable in Σ n+1 -IND (see, e.g., [Bus98] ). If r is a left quantifier step then it is treated similarly to the two right quantifier cases above by De Morgan duality. If r is a propositional step then the treatment is simple, following directly from Prop. 27. If r is an initial sequent we immediately hit a contradiction, since all of the axioms are provably true in all assignments. If r is a substitution step, then the existence of the appropriate assignment follows directly from the substitution property, Prop. 27.6.
Finally, we may show that every state of the run of Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) on A π b is final, by Σ n+1 -induction, since it always correctly follows a branch of π. Thus we have that Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) ∈ L(A π b ). Now we can give a formalised proof of the soundness of cyclic proofs:
Theorem 31 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, formalised). For n ≥ 0, there are IΣ n+2 proofs of size polynomial in n of: ∀π a CA preproof containing only Σ n formulae.
Proof. First, instantiating X in Cor. 26 with a ∆ n+1 formula ϕ n yields O(|ϕ n |)-size IΣ n+2 proofs of (6.3)[ϕ n /X]. Hence, setting ϕ n to be Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) and appealing to Prop. 30 above, we arrive at IΣ n+2 proofs of size polynomial in n of:
∀π a CA preproof containing only Σ n formulae. A π b ⊑ A π t ⊃ ∀ρ 0 .(N, ρ 0 n conc(π) ⊃ ArAcc(Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −), A π t )) (6.7)
Now, working in IΣ n+2 , to prove (6.6) let π satisfy A π b ⊑ A π t . For contradiction assume, for some ρ 0 , that N, ρ 0 n conc(π). By Prop. 30 we have Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −) ∈ L(A π b ), so we henceforth write Γ x ⇒ ∆ x and ρ x for the sequent and assignment at the x th position of Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −). By (6.7) above we have ArAcc(Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −), A π t ), so let x witness its outer existential, cf. (6.1). Now, let y be the maximum value of ρ x (t) for all terms t occurring in Γ x ⇒ ∆ x . Again by ArAcc(Branch n (π, ρ 0 , −, −), A π t ), we have that there is some (finite) trace z beginning from Γ x ⇒ ∆ x that progresses y + 1 times. Writing z(i) to denote the i th term in the trace z, we may show by induction on i ≤ |z| 7 that, if there are j progress points between z(0) and z(i), then we have that ρ x (z(0)) ≥ ρ x+i (z(i)) + j. In particular, y ≥ ρ x (z(0)) ≥ ρ x+|z| (z(|z|)) + (y + 1) ≥ y + 1, yielding a contradiction. 6.3. PA exponentially simulates CA. We can now give our main proof complexity result:
Theorem 32. If π is a CA proof of ϕ, then we can construct a PA proof of ϕ of size exponential in |π|.
Proof. Take the least n ∈ N such that π contains only Σ n formulae; in particular n ≤ |π|. Since π is a correct cyclic proof, there is a PA proof of A π b ⊑ A π t , by exhaustive search. In fact, such a proof in Q may be constructed in exponential time in |π|, thanks to Obs. 21 and Σ 1 -completeness of Q (see, e.g., [HP93] ). Hence, by instantiating π in Thm. 31, we have IΣ n+2 proofs of N, ∅ n ϕ of size exponential in |π|. Finally by the reflection property, Prop. 28, we have that IΣ n+2 ⊢ ϕ with proofs of size exponential in |π|.
Notice that we already have the converse polynomial simulation of PA in CA by the results of [Sim17] or, alternatively, by Prop. 12.
IΣ n+1 contains CΣ n
In fact the proof method we developed in the last section allows us to recover a result on logical complexity too. By tracking precisely all the bounds therein, we obtain that CΣ n is contained in IΣ n+2 , which is already an improvement to Simpson's result (see Sect. 10 for a comparison). To derive such bounds, in this section we concern ourselves only with cyclic proofs containing Σ n formulae. The universal closures of the conclusions of such proofs axiomatise CΣ n , cf. Dfn. 10, so more complex theorems of CΣ n are thence derivable by pure logic.
In fact, we may actually improve this logical bound and arrive at an optimal result (given Thm. 15). By more carefully analysing the proof methods of [KMPM16] , namely an inspection of the proofs of Thms. 5 and 12 in that work, we have that:
Notice here that the universal quantification over NBA is external, so that the complementation proofs are not necessarily uniform. This is not a trivial result, since it relies on a version of Ramsey's theorem, the additive Ramsey theorem, which can be proved by induction on the number of 'colours'. Usual forms of Ramsey's theorem are not proved by such an argument, and in fact it is well known that RCA 0 cannot even prove Ramsey's theorem for pairs with only two colours (see, e.g., [Hir14] ). This allows us to 'un-uniformise' the results of the previous section, using Prop. 33 above instead of Lemma 22.3, in order to 'trade off' proof complexity for logical complexity:
Proposition 34 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, non-uniformly formalised). Let n ≥ 0 and π be a CA proof containing only Σ n formulae. IΣ n+1 ⊢ ∀ρ 0 .(N, ρ 0 n conc(π)).
Proof sketch. We mimic the entire argument of Thm. 31 by instantiating the fixed proof π and using Prop. 33 above instead of Lemma 22.3. In particular, the required 'non-uniform' versions of Thm. 25 and Cor. 26 become derivable in RCA 0 and IΣ 1 (X) resp., thus reducing the global induction complexity by one level. Hence we arrive at a 'non-uniform' version of Thm. 31, peculiar to the fixed proof π we began with, proved entirely within IΣ n+1 , as required.
Theorem 35. For n ≥ 0, we have that CΣ n ⊆ IΣ n+1 .
Proof. By the definition of CΣ n , cf. Dfn. 10, it suffices to derive in IΣ n+1 just the (possibly open) conclusions of CΣ n proofs containing only Σ n formulae, and so the result follows directly from Prop. 34 above.
7.1. On the proof complexity of CΣ n . One might be tempted to conclude that the elementary simulation of CA by PA should go through already for CΣ n by IΣ n+2 (independently of n), due to the bounds implicit in the proof of Thm. 32. Furthermore, if we are willing to give up a few more exponentials in complexity, one may even bound the size of IΣ 1 proofs arising from Prop. 33 by an appropriate elementary function (though this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper).
However, we must be conscious of the 'robustness' of the definition of CΣ n proofs in terms of complexity. The one we gave, which essentially requires cyclic proofs to contain only Σ n -formulae, is more similar to 'free-cut free' IΣ n proofs than general ones, cf. Thm. 5, so it seems unfair to compare these notions of IΣ n and CΣ n in terms of proof complexity. In fact we may define a more natural notion of a CΣ n proof from the point of view of complexity, while inducing the same theory.
First, let us recall some notions from, e.g., [Bro06, BS11] . Any cyclic proof can be written in 'cycle normal form', where any 'backpointer' (e.g., the conclusions of upper sequents marked • until now) points only to a sequent that has occurred below it in the proof. Referring to the terminology of [Bro06, BS11] etc., we say that a sequent is a bud in a cyclic proof if it has a backpointer pointing to an identical sequent (called the companion).
Proposition 36. If ϕ has a CA proof whose buds and companions contain only Σ n formulae then CΣ n ⊢ ϕ.
Proof idea. Once again, we simply apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 5, treating any backpointers as 'initial sequents' for a proof in cycle normal form.
This result again shows the robustness of the definition of CΣ n as a theory, and we would further argue that, from the point of view of proof complexity, the backpointer-condition induced by Prop. 36 above constitutes a better notion of 'proof' for CΣ n . At the same time we see that it is not easy to compare the proof complexity of this notion of CΣ n and IΣ n+1 , due to the fact that we have used a free-cut elimination result for the simulations in both directions, inducing a possibly non-elementary blowup in proof size. It would be interesting if a more fine-grained result regarding the relative proof complexity of IΣ n+1 and CΣ n could be established, but this is beyond the scope of the current work.
Some metamathematical results
In this section we make some further observations on various properties of the cyclic theories in this work. The exposition we give is brief, since we follow standard methods, but we provide appropriate references for the reader. 8.1. Provably recursive functions of C∆ 0 . As a corollary of the Thms. 15 and 35 we have that, for n ≥ 1, the provably recursive functions of CΣ n (i.e. its Π 2 -theorems) are precisely those of IΣ n+1 , which were characterised by Parsons in [Par72] as certain fragments of Gödel's system T or, equivalently, by recursion up to suitably bounded towers of ω in [Bus95] . This apparently leaves open a gap for the case of C∆ 0 (a.k.a. CΣ 0 ). However, recall that CΣ n is defined as the theory axiomatised by the universal closures of cyclic proofs containing only Σ n formulae, so we have:
Observation 37. For n ≥ 0, CΣ n is axiomatised by a set of Π n+1 sentences.
In particular C∆ 0 is Π 1 axiomatised, meaning that it is a 'bounded' theory, in the sense of Parikh [Par71] . Consequently, its provably recursive functions actually coincide with those of I∆ 0 :
Proposition 38. The provably recursive functions of C∆ 0 are just the functions in the linear-time hierarchy.
To briefly explain the above result, Parikh's theorem implies that, for any Π 1 -axiomatised theory T over the language of arithmetic, if T ⊢ ∀x.∃y.ϕ, for ϕ ∈ ∆ 0 , then in fact T ⊢ ∀x.∃y < t.ϕ for some term t. (This may be proved simply via free-cut elimination, Thm. 5.) This means we may simply search for a witness of linear size (in terms of the bit string representation) verifying some predicate in the linear-time hierarchy, whence Prop. 38 above follows since the linear-time hierarchy is closed under bounded quantifiers.
See, e.g., [Bus98, CN10] for further discussions on the provably recursive functions of fragments of (bounded) arithmetic, and see, e.g., [CK02] for more details on relationships between the language of arithmetic and recursive function classes. 8.2. Failure of cut-admissibility. As a corollary of our results, we may formally conclude that the cut rule is not admissible in CA, or indeed any of its fragments CΣ n . 8 In fact the situation is rather worse than that:
Corollary 39 (of Thms. 15 and 35). Let n ≥ 1. The class of CA proofs with only Σ n−1 cuts is not complete for even the Π 1 theorems of CΣ n .
Proof. For a recursively axiomatised theory T , let Con(T ) be an appropriate Π 1 sentence expressing that "T does not prove 0 = 1". It is well-known that IΣ n+1 ⊢ Con(IΣ n ) (see, e.g., [Kay91, Bus98, HP93] ), so also CΣ n ⊢ Con(IΣ n ) by Thm. 15. For contradiction, suppose Con(IΣ n ) concludes some CA proof with only Σ n−1 cuts; then in fact CΣ n−1 ⊢ Con(IΣ n ) by degeneralising (for the case n = 1) and the subformula property. However this implies IΣ n ⊢ Con(IΣ n ) by Thm. 35, which is impossible by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for IΣ n .
A. DAS
See, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93] for further discussions on the provability of consistency principles for fragments of arithmetic. 8.3. Reflection and consistency. Thanks to the uniformity of the results from Sect. 6, we can give some fundamental metalogical properties regarding provable soundness and consistency of cyclic proofs. First we will fix our formalisation of CΣ n -provability (of arbitrary sequents, not just Σ n ) in the language of arithmetic.
Let n ≥ 0. We will fix some appropriate formula Prf n (π, ϕ) expressing that π is a CΣ n proof of ϕ. We suppose that proofs are written as usual derivations (finite trees or dags) whose leaves are either axiom instances from Q, or otherwise some (possibly open) Σ n sequent labelled by an associated cyclic proof that derives it (containing only Σ n formulae). Descriptively, Prf n (x, y) checks that π is a proof of ϕ by first checking that it is a wellformed derivation, then checking that each premiss is either an axiom instance from Q or is labelled by a correct cyclic proof deriving it. In the latter case it must search for a certificate verifying that the cyclic proof satisfies the automaton-inclusion condition, i.e. that A b ⊑ A t .
While Prf n (π, ϕ) is recursive in π and ϕ, this may not be provably the case in weak theories such as I∆ 0 . Thus we fix Prf n to be an appropriate Σ 1 formula, as described above, and we write n ϕ for ∃π.Prf n (π, ϕ). We write Π k -Rfn(CΣ n ) for the (local) Π k -reflection principle of CΣ n . I.e.
Corollary 40 (of Thm. 31). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣ n+2 ⊢ Π n+1 -Rfn(CΣ n ).
Proof. Let ϕ( x) be a Σ n formula. Working in IΣ n+2 , suppose that n ∀ x.ϕ (so that CΣ n ⊢ ∀ x.ϕ( x)). We may assume that every formula occurring in a CΣ n proof of the sequent ⇒ ϕ( x) is Σ n , thanks to free-cut elimination, Thm. 5 (recall that this result is provable already in IΣ 1 ). Thus we have N, ∅ n+1 ∀ x.ϕ( x) by Thm. 31 and Prop. 27.5, whence the result follows by the reflection property, Prop. 28.
Notice that, while the statement of Cor. 40 above is peculiar to the current formulation of a CΣ n proof, Prf n , it holds also under any other notion of proof that is provably equivalent in IΣ n+2 . In particular, in Sect. 7.1 we discussed another notion of proof for CΣ n which, morally, allowed "free cuts" to occur inside cycles. Since the equivalence of the two formulations, Prop. 36, is proved using only free-cut elimination and basic reasoning, all formalisable in IΣ 1 , the version of Cor. 40 for that more liberal notion of a CΣ n proof holds too.
As usual, we may see Π 1 -reflection as just another formulation of 'consistency'. Let us write Con(CΣ n ) for the sentence ¬ n 0 = 1 (notice that this is a Π 1 sentence).
Corollary 41 (of Thm. 31). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣ n+2 ⊢ Con(CΣ n )
Proof. Follows immediately from Cor. 40 above by substituting 0 = 1 for ϕ.
We will see in the next subsection that this result is, in fact, optimal with respect to logical complexity. 8.4. Incompleteness. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the theories CΣ n suffer from Gödel's incompleteness theorems since, while CΣ n is not obviously effectively axiomatisable, it does have an effective proof system, arithmetically formalised by the aforementioned formula Prf n . We explicitly give the incompleteness result for CΣ n here for both self-contained interest and since we rely on it in the next section. We will also use it to derive the optimality of Cor. 41 with respect to logical complexity.
Proposition 42 (Hilbert-Bernays-Löb conditions). For n ≥ 0 we have:
Proof sketch. For (nec), since n ϕ is semi-recursive, if it is true then it is provable already over Q by Σ 1 -completeness, so in particular I∆ 0 ⊢ n ϕ whenever CΣ n ⊢ ϕ. For (K) notice that the combination of two proofs π 1 , π 2 by the modus ponens rule has size O(|π 1 |+|π 2 |), so its existence and correctness will be provable in I∆ 0 , whose provably recursive functions are just those of the linear-time hierarchy (see, e.g., [HP93] ). Finally, (4) is routine: working in I∆ 0 , given a CΣ n proof π of ϕ, we simply describe the natural (non-cyclic) proof of Prf n (π, ϕ) that just evaluates the formula.
Finally, since the 'diagonal lemma' holds even in Q (see, e.g., [HP93] ), we can prove Gödel's second incompleteness result as usual, e.g. by formalising Löb's theorem. We omit proof details since the argument is standard, but the interested reader is referred to the encyclopedia entry [Ver17] for an overview of the proof.
Theorem 43 (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, for cyclic theories). For n ≥ 0, as long as CΣ n is consistent (i.e. CΣ n 0 = 1), we have CΣ n Con(CΣ n ).
Consequently we have that Cor. 41 is, in fact, optimal in terms of logical complexity:
Corollary 44. For n ≥ 0, we have IΣ n+1 Con(CΣ n ).
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then also CΣ n ⊢ Con(CΣ n ) by Π 1 -conservativity, cf. Thm. 15, which contradicts Gödel's second incompleteness above, Thm. 43.
Thus we have that Cor. 41 is, in fact, optimal. We will see in the next section that this has a curious consequence for the reverse mathematics of results in ω-automaton theory. Our result is non-uniform in the sense that unprovability holds for any explicit primitive recursive determinisation construction. As far as we are aware this accounts for all known proofs of McNaughton's theorem, suggesting that it is unlikely to be provable at all, in its usual uniform version, in RCA 0 . That said, we point out that McNaughton's theorem itself is arguably not so well-defined in the context of reverse mathematics, since it is not clear in RCA 0 that different versions of the theorem coincide, in particular with respect to the choice of (a) acceptance conditions (parity, Muller, etc.) and (b) formulation of the set of states infinitely often hit during a run (negative, ∀, vs. positive, ∃).
Our argument is based on an alternative route to proving the soundness of CΣ n . Assuming that an appropriate version of McNaughton's theorem is indeed provable in RCA 0 , we are in fact able to formalise the soundness argument for CΣ n already in IΣ n+1 . However, consequently we have that IΣ n+1 proves the consistency of CΣ n , and so CΣ n proves its own consistency by Π 1 -conservativity, cf. Thm. 15, which is absurd by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for CΣ n , Thm. 43. 9.1. Deterministic parity automata and universality. Due to space considerations, we only briefly present the details of parity automata. The reader is encouraged to consult, e.g., [Tho97] , for further details on automaton theory for ω-languages.
A (non-deterministic) Rabin or parity automaton (NRA) is a just a NBA where, instead of a set of final states F , we have a function c : Q → N, called a colouring. A word is accepted by a NRA if it has a run in which the least colour of a state occurring infinitely often is even. The notion of deterministic parity automaton (DRA) is analogous to that of a DBA, i.e. requiring the transition relation to be deterministic and total.
Theorem 45 (McNaughton, [McN66] ). For every NBA A, we can effectively construct a DRA accepting the same language.
Actually, McNaughton gave this result for deterministic Muller automata rather than parity automata. The equivalence of these two models is well-known though, as we previously mentioned, it is not clear whether RCA 0 can prove their equivalence. The fact that we use parity automata here is arbitrary; we believe a similar exposition could be carried out for Muller automata.
As for DBA, we may naturally express language acceptance for a DRA A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , c) by an arithmetical formula, i.e. without SO quantifiers. For our purposes, it will be useful to take a 'negative' formulation of acceptance:
⊃ "c(q) is even"
We write σ : q 1 * → δ q 2 if a word σ ∈ A * determines a path along δ starting at q 1 and ending at q 2 . We write + → δ when the path is nonempty. A simple loop about a state q ∈ Q is a nonempty path along δ beginning and ending at q that visits no intermediate state more than once. We write Univ(A) for a standard recursive procedure for testing universality of A: "for every odd-coloured state q reachable from q 0 , any simple loop about q contains a state coloured by an even number < c(q)". More formally, writing σ ′ ≤ σ if σ ′ is a prefix of σ:
Clearly this formula is provably ∆ 0 1 in RCA 0 . Furthermore:
Proof. Working in RCA 0 , let A = (A, Q, δ, q 0 , c) be a DRA. For the left-right implication, suppose there is some X ∈ A ω such that X / ∈ L(A). Thus we have some q ∈ Q such that c(q) is odd and the following hold:
2) Let x 0 be a witness to (9.2), and let x 0 < x 1 < x 2 such that q X (x 1 ) = q X (x 2 ) = q, by two applications of (9.1). We will need the following intermediate (arithmetical) result,
which follows directly by induction on |σ|, eliminating intermediate loops at each inductive step in the case of non-simplicity. Now we apply this result to the sequence (X(x)) x 2 x=x 1 to obtain a simple loop about q; moreover since this will be a subsequence of (X(x)) x 2 x=x 1 , we have that any even-coloured state occurring in it is coloured > c(q), since x 0 witnesses (9.2) and x 0 < x 1 < x 2 , so ¬Univ(A).
For the right-left implication, we proceed again by contraposition. Suppose ¬Univ(A), and let σ : q 0 * → δ q and τ : q + → δ q such that c(q) is odd, and τ is a simple loop containing no states coloured < c(q). We may now set X = στ ω (which is easily defined by comprehension) and show that X / ∈ L(A). For this it suffices to show (9.1) and (9.2) above. For the former, given x we set x ′ = |σ| + m|τ | > x, for some sufficiently large m. For the latter, we set x = |σ| as the witness to the outer existential, whence (9.2) follows by construction of τ . A) ))) Assuming this is provable in RCA 0 for some primitive recursive function d, we will reproduce a version of Thm. 25 in IΣ n+1 . The idea is that, rather than expressing the fact that L(A 1 ) ⊆ L(A 2 ) by saying "(A c 1 ⊔ A 2 ) c is empty", as we did in Sects. 6 and 7, we may rather express it as "A c 1 ⊔ A 2 is universal", relying on McNaughton − d and Prop. 46 above. For a DBA A 1 and a NBA A 2 we define A 1 ⊑ d A 2 as Univ(d(A c 1 ⊔ A 2 ))). Let us write (6.3 d ) for the equation (6.3) with ⊑ replaced by ⊑ d , i.e.:
We have the following analogue to Thm. 25:
Proof. Mimicking the proof of Thm. 25, we work in RCA 0 and suppose X ∈ L(A 1 ) and A 1 ⊑ d A 2 . We have:
We may use this result to reconstruct the entire formalised soundness argument for CΣ n of Sect. 6 in IΣ n+1 instead of IΣ n+2 , assuming McNaughton − d . In particular, using Prop. 47 above instead of Thm. 25, we may recover versions of Cor. 26, Thm. 31 and Cor. 40 for IΣ n+1 instead of IΣ n+2 , with respect to (6.3 d ) instead of (6.3). Formally, let Π k -Rfn d (CΣ n ) denote the formulation of the Π k -reflection principle for CΣ n induced by using ⊑ d instead of ⊑ throughout Sect. 8.3, with respect to the definitions of Prf n and n . Similarly, let Con d (CΣ n ) be the induced consistency principle.
Proof sketch. The argument goes through just like that of Cors. 40 and 41 of Thm. 31, except that we use Prop. 47 instead of Thm. 25. Appealing to the assumption that RCA 0 ⊢ McNaughton − d , this version of the argument requires only Σ 0 1 -IND instead of Σ 0 2 -IND, thus yielding IΣ n+1 proofs overall once we substitute the appropriate formulae for X.
Theorem 49. RCA 0 McNaughton − d , for any primitive recursive function d. Proof sketch. The same argument as Cor. 44 holds for our revised notion of consistency; in particular we have that IΣ 1 Con d (C∆ 0 ). The result now follows immediately by the contraposition of Prop. 48 above, for n = 0.
Conclusions and further remarks
In this work we developed the theory of cyclic arithmetic by studying the logical complexity of its proofs. We showed that inductive and cyclic proofs of the same theorems require similar logical complexity, and obtained tight quantifier complexity bounds in both directions. We further showed that the proof complexity of the two frameworks differs only elementarily, although it remains unclear how to properly measure proof complexity for the fragments CΣ n , even if the theory seems well-defined and robust. Many of these issues constitute avenues for further work.
10.1. Comparison to the proofs of [BT17b] and [Sim17] . One reason for our improved quantifier complexity compared to [Sim17] , is that Simpson rather relies on Weak König's Lemma (WKL) to obtain an infinite branch. This, a priori, increases quantifier complexity of the argument, since WKL is known to be unprovable in RCA 0 even in the presence of Σ 0 2 -IND; in fact, it is incomparable to Σ 0 2 -IND (see, e.g., [KMPM16] ). That said, we believe that the 'bounded-width WKL' (bwWKL) of [KMPM16] should suffice to carry out Simpson's proof, and this principle is provable already in RCA 0 + Σ 0 2 -IND. Applying this strategy to his proof yields only that CΣ n ⊆ IΣ n+3 , since bwWKL is applied to a Π 0 n+1 set, though this should improve to a IΣ n+2 bound by using the non-uniform version of NBA complementation implicit in [KMPM16] , cf. Prop. 33. We reiterate that the main improvement here is in giving a uniform formulation of those results; not only does this lead to a better proof complexity result, cf. Thm. 32, but we also recover a metamathematical account of the theories CΣ n , cf. 8. Berardi and Tatsuta's approach, [BT17b] , is rather interesting since it is arguably more 'structural' in nature, relying on proof-level manipulations rather than reflection principles. That said there are still crucial sources of nonconstructivity, namely in an 'arithmetical' version of Ramsey's theorem (Thm. 5.2) and the consequent Podelski-Rybalchenko termination theorem (Thm. 6.1). Both of these increase quantifier complexity by several levels, and so their approach does not seem to yield comparable logical bounds to this work. Since proof complexity is not a primary consideration of their work, it is not simple to track the precise bounds in [BT17b] . There are some apparent sources of exponential blowups, 9 though it seems that the global simulation is elementary. As before, we reiterate that the major improvement in the present work is in the uniformity of our exposition: the approach of [BT17b] is fundamentally non-uniform so does not yield any metamathematical account of cyclic arithmetic.
10.2. On the correctness criteria for cyclic proofs. Since the algorithms used to check correctness of a cyclic preproof reduce to the inclusion of Büchi automata, the exponential simulation of CA by PA is optimal, unless there is a nondeterministic subexponential-time algorithm for PSPACE or, more interestingly, there is an easier way to check cyclic proof correctness. (In fact, technically, it would suffice to have an easier criterion for a larger class of preproofs that were, nonetheless, sound.) As far as we know, PSPACE remains the best known upper bound for checking the correctness of general cyclic preproofs, although efficient algorithms have recently been proposed for less general correctness criteria, cf. [Str17, NST18] . Thus, it would be interesting to prove a corresponding lower bound or otherwise improve the upper bound. Conditional such results could be obtained via, say, certain polynomial upper bounds on proof complexity in CA: for instance, if CA were to have polynomial-size proofs of each correct Büchi inclusion then cyclic proof correctness would not be polynomial-time checkable, unless NP = PSPACE. Unfortunately naïve attempts at this approach fail, but the general question of whether PA and CA are exponentially separated seems pertinent.
On the other hand, the translation of Lemma 16 from inductive proofs to cyclic proofs is rather structured. In light of the converse result in Sect. 6 it might make sense in further work, from the point of view of logical complexity, to consider only cyclic proofs accepted by some weaker more efficiently verified criterion, such as [Str17, NST18]. 10.3. Interpreting ordinary inductive definitions in arithmetic. In earlier work by Brotherston and Simpson, cyclic proofs were rather considered over a system of FO logic extended by 'ordinary' Martin-Löf inductive definitions [ML71] , known as FOL ID [Bro06, BS07, BS11]. Berardi and Tatsuta showed in [BT17b] that the cyclic system CLKID ω for FOL ID is equivalent to the inductive system LKID, when at least arithmetic is present, somewhat generalising Simpson's result [Sim17] . We point out that ordinary Martin-Löf inductive definitions can be interpreted in arithmetic in the usual way by a Σ 1 inductive construction of 'approximants', and a proof of CLKID ω may be similarly interpreted lineby-line in CA. (This is similar to the role of the 'stage number predicates' in [BT17b] .) In particular, this means that CLKID ω (+PA) is conservative over CA. We reiterate that the interest behind the results of [BT17b] is rather the structural nature of the transformations, but this observation also exemplifies why CA is a natural and canonical object of study, as argued in [Sim17] .
10.4. Cyclic propositional proof complexity. One perspective gained from this work comes in the setting of propositional proof complexity (see, e.g., [CN10, Kra95] ). Thm. 15 of Sect. 4 should relativise to theories with oracles too. For instance, we may formalise in C∆ 0 (f ), where f is a fresh (uninterpreted) function symbol, a proof of the relativised version of the (finitary) pigeonhole principle (see App. A). This formula is known to be unprovable in I∆ 0 (f ) due to lower bounds on propositional proofs of bounded depth [KPW95, PBI93] .
At the same time the 'Paris-Wilkie' translation [PW81] , which fundamentally links I∆ 0 (f ) to bounded-depth proofs, works locally on a proof, at the level of formulae. Consequently one may still apply the translation to the lines of a C∆ 0 (f ) proof to obtain small 'proof-like' objects containing only formulae of bounded depth, and a cyclic proof structure. One would expect that this corresponds to some strong form of 'extension', since it is known that adding usual extension to bounded systems already yields full 'extended Frege' proofs. However at the same time, some of this power has been devolved to the proof structure rather than simply at the level of the formula, and so could yield insights into how to prove simulations between fragments of Hilbert-Frege systems with extension.
We point out that recent work, [AL18] , relating cyclic proof structures to proof complexity has already appeared, albeit with a different correctness criterion. 
